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ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether better property rights will increase joint
productivity of agricultural and timber products in the Brazilian Amazon.  Farrell output-
based technical efficiency and technological progress measures are derived by using
DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) for Amazonian counties and are regressed on non-
discretional variables such as land title.  Land title is found to significantly improve the
technical efficiency.
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1. Introduction
Poor property rights can cause both misallocation of resources and wasteful
resource use.  In the Brazilian Amazon, poor land management and less than utilization
of opened area are often seen in areas under absentee or imperfect ownership and on
public lands where government monitoring is not present.  Since the 1980’s, when
logging activity rapidly expanded, the Brazilian Amazon has experienced migration of
agropastoral producers who follow logging roads into the forests and clear forested sites
(Uhl et al, 1991).  When ownership is not well established, loggers tend to ignore the
agricultural suitability of the land when they place logging roads.  This unplanned land
management can result in poor agricultural productivity.  Furthermore, if poor property
rights discourage intensive road building by loggers and hence intensive following-on
land clearing, timber and agricultural productivity per unit land tends to be low.
Poor property rights can also discourage migration of efficient entrepreneurs and
skilled labor.  This can not only directly cause low labor productivity but also cause
inefficient utilization of capital, resulting in poor productivity in both timber and
agricultural sectors.
Given this situation, better property rights could increase joint agricultural-timber
productivity if they induce more efficient use of land, labor and capital.  If productivity
could be increased, economic progress could occur with less extensive deforestation.
This could provide more forest at a given level of development and produce
environmental benefits for Brazil and other countries.3
Using data for 257 counties in the Brazilian Amazon in 1985 and 1995, this paper
will (1) develop measures of timber-agricultural joint productivity within the sectors that
are directly associated with deforestation, and (2) measure effects of property rights on
factor productivity in the timber and agriculture.
2. Property Rights and Productivity
The major causes of poor property rights in the Brazilian Amazon are imperfect
title provision and a lack of legal enforcement on land ownership.  Until the mid-1960’s,
when the large-scale colonization projects started, this area was covered by forest and
was very sparsely populated.  Further, most of the land was public domain.  Then, the
federal and state government transferred ownership of the land to private claimants so as
to create an incentive for migration into the area.  Low fees were established for titles to
land claims
1 to attract landless farmers in the poor neighboring regions and urban
entrepreneurs who were interested in the cattle business.
However, homesteaded area was always larger than area for which land titles
were actually provided.  For example, 73 percent of occupied area had formal titles in
1970 in the Legal Amazon (IBGE, 1970).  Even when title was established, lack of legal
support for the protection of property rights was severe in the earlier period of
development (Schneider, 1995).  Thus, property rights remained imperfect.
Illegal use of public land by loggers and small cultivators has also been common
in the Brazilian Amazon.  Government’s regulation of the use of public land has been
ineffective because high monitoring costs have discouraged the government from4
controlling use.  Users of this land do not have an incentive to incur costs for gaining
title—time for titling procedure, payment for the title, and concession fee—when the
probability of being discovered using untitled land is small and benefits from legal
occupancy are low.  Poor property security consequently discouraged effective use of
land and forced an increase in private expenditure for protection of property
(Mendelsohn, 1994).
Having poor property rights can discourage efficient and sustainable land use.  In
the case of open access, the extreme case of weak property rights, soil and tree resources
are mined.  Farmers and loggers do not make joint production decisions, and land is not
logged in a way that benefits agricultural production.  Forested land with titles that is
under absentee ownership is commonly rented or sold to logging companies according to
the authors’ field survey.  Loggers’ choice of site and placement of logging roads is not
consistent with jointly efficient planning of timber and agriculture because the owner of
the land is absent and hence does not monitor loggers’ behavior.
Poor property rights can also affect the quality of labor force and level of
entrepreneur management.  Schneider (1995) observes that people with lower opportunity
costs (less educated) tend to arrive at the colonized area earlier than those with higher
opportunity costs who tend to buy the land from these early comers in the Brazilian
Amazon.  Given that property rights evolve for land that is close to more developed
centers, unskilled people will tend to occupy land under poorer property rights.
Therefore, poor property rights can tend to correlate with a higher share of producers
with poor skills, and with more environmentally damaging production practices.
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The average land price in the Legal Amazon in 1975 was $74 in the 1985 US dollar.  It implies that fees
charged for acquisition of land title was low.5
3. Methdology
Better property rights can be an important key factor in the development, possibly
leading to a win-win situation where production is boosted without incurring further land
clearing, and wasteful use of labor and capital.  The following two steps are essential to
pursue this hypothesis: (1) to define a measure of productivity, and (2) to provide a
method to test this hypothesis.
We will analyze total factor productivity (TFP) with regard to labor, land and
capital as a measure of productivity because these factors are fundamental inputs of
production.  TFP is a more appropriate measure of productivity than single factor
productivity because these factors of production are substitutes and because property
rights institution can affect use of all these factors.  We will incorporate major primal
products in the Brazilian Amazon that are associated with deforestation into the output
vector.  Our model can thus capture an entire framework that is related to land clearing.
Our analysis focuses on variation of TFP, and our results for technical efficiency will be
interpreted as TFP.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a method to measure technical efficiency
based on the piecewise-linear production frontier that is characterized by lines that
envelope the data points.  DEA has an advantage of being able to avoid specifying
functional forms of production function.  It can incorporate multiple inputs/outputs
without aggregation by using linear programming where individual inputs/outputs enter
in separate constraints associated with the envelopment condition.  This technique is6
appropriate for modeling the highly complex multiple sector production structure in the
Brazilian Amazon.
In the Brazilian Amazon, the major agricultural production includes cattle, rice,
beans, cassava, corn, and banana.  Total value of production of these crops accounts for
58 percent in 1985 and 32 percent in 1995 of the total agricultural products in this area.
Since industry and commercial sectors do not require a large area of land for their
operation and since land requirement for housing is very small compared to the
agropastoral area, it is reasonable to assume that cleared land is used mostly for
agricultural production in the Brazilian Amazon.  It is also assumed that most of labor
and capital available in a given county is used to produce the above selected agricultural
products and timber.  The timber sector has increased its importance in the Amazonian
economy.  The value of log production grew to be as great as the total value of these six
agricultural products in 1995.
Fundamental inputs are cleared land, H, labor, L, and capital, K.  The output set of
this technology is
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where 
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A y + ℜ ∈  is an agricultural output vector and  + ℜ ∈ T y  is production of log.  This
technology is assumed to satisfy free disposability and convexity.
Land area that is already cleared by the previous period is denoted as H-1, and it is
assumed that such land will remain cleared in the current period.  On the other hand, new
farm land is assumed to be obtained with labor cost
2 (López and Niklitschek ,1991).
Since level of timber production also facilitates land clearing, new land, 1 − − ≡ ∆ H H H ,7
can be defined as a function of L-1 and y
T
-1, labor use and timber output in the previous
period, respectively.  Thus, (3.1) can be rewritten as
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The Farrell technical efficiency for this technology is defined as
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The linear programming for deriving the inverse TE is
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Here, TE
-1 is computed for a county k where k=1, …, J.  The terms,  j z  are
intensity variables.  The non-negativity constraints for  j z  is imposed for the convexity of
output set.  Constant returns to scale is assumed.
 Implication of property rights on technical efficiency is then examined.  The
measure of property rights that is most commonly used in the empirical literature is land
title (e.g. Lopez, 1995; Alston et al, 1996).  Land title is an indicator of land tenure
security that is based on legal support of the government or community-level recognition
of ownership.  Land title is also an indicator of the extent to which returns from land are
accrued to a land holder.  Therefore, having land title implies enforceability and
disposability which are important elements of property rights.
                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Land maintenance costs such as soil improvement and pasture rejuvenation might not be trivial but tend to
be small when compared with costs for land clearing.8
Since we use aggregate data, a binary variable that represents having or not
having a title, as is often used for household data, is not applicable.  Instead, a ratio of
area held by household with title to total county area is used.  This measure represents an
average degree of property rights to a county.
Once Farrell’s technical efficiency (TE) is derived, this index will be regressed on
property rights, market access and demographic variables.  Explanatory variables will be
chosen so that they are exogenous to the production structure and they are not correlated
with the variables in the DEA stage.  If they are, results of both first and second stage
procedures will be biased (McCarty and Yaisawarng, 1993).
Some of these variables exogenous to the decision making units are, however,
under government control.  Therefore, policy implication will be derived from the result
of the second-stage procedure.
Our second-stage procedure regression will follow the truncated regression
(Tobit) model in McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) since the dependent variable, 
1 − TE , is
bounded from below at unity. The model will be specified as follows:
(3.5) k k k u r TE + =
− β








where k denotes k
 th  county, rk  is a vector of explanatory variables, β  is a vector of
parameters and uk is a random term that is assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean 0 and constant variance 
2 σ .9
3. Data and Empirical Results
Data
Descriptive statistics for data used in empirical analysis are provided in Table 3.1.
This data is for 257 Brazilian Amazon counties in the years 1985 and 1995.  It is obtained
from the DESMAT data set of the IPEA – Institute of Applied Economic Research.
Inputs include capital, labor and cleared land, and lagged inputs include labor and timber
production in 1985.




Cattle Produced (head) 24,100 81,389 0 820,873        3,686
Rice Produced (ton) 6,575 27,566 0 354,227           878
Maize Produced (ton) 6,914 39,798 0 460,889           561
Bean Produced (ton) 440 3,035 0 47,929             58
Cassava Produced (ton) 11,424 28,615 0 273,068        2,620
Banana Produced (ton) 222 577 0 5,555             45
Timber Produced (m3) 180,345 1,447,587 0 22,426,581        2,642
Capital (1985US$) 238,697 1,072,708 683 14,130,725       33,914
Labor in 1985 12,730 26,287 216 304,523        8,989
Labor in 1995 16,449 30,734 219 324,440        6,229
Cleared Land (km2) in 1985 976 3,017 1 29,893           205
Cleared Land (km2) in 1995 1,525 6,013 1 64,709           210
Area with Titles (ha) in 1985 394,026 1,190,281 285 12,948,954 101,794
Area with Titles (ha) in 1985 445,258 1,567,341 94 16,594,672 85,262
Population in 1985 51,239 121,907 1,406 1,072,580 19,890
Population in 1995 68,837 168,802 1,406 1,517,951 22,497
Density of Good Soil 1,264 4,701 0 42,138 0
Distance to State Seat
(1,000km)
359 311 0 1,366 258
Area (km2) 19,749 49,952 105 361,329 3,542
Results
We derived an inverse TE from DEA models that are based on the technology
defined (3.2).  The mean of TE
-1 is 1.6, the standard deviation is 1.0, the maximum is 9.710
and median is 1.3.  The number of efficient units (TE
-1=1) is 75.  It is 30 percent of the
total number of samples.
Results from the second-stage procedure, in which TE
-1 is regressed on the
property rights and other exogenous variables in 1995 and 1985, are in Table 3.2.  They
generally meet a priori expectations.  Technical efficiency increases with density of titled
land and decreases with population density.  Distance to state seat and soil quality are not
significant in any of the cases.  These estimates are consistent with our theory that better
property rights encourage technically efficient resource use.  Given that lagged labor and
timber represent land clearing activity level, property rights variable can be thought of as
affecting land clearing patterns.  For example, under poor property rights, road building
by loggers and land clearing for farming tend to be extensive.  In such a case, efficient
land use is hindered by the extensiveness of cleared land.
Population density worsens technical efficiency.  Direct consequences of high
population pressure are high demand for land and a greater labor force.  These factors
tend to increase pressure for land clearing where land clearing is not regulated.
Table 3.3 contains a simulation of change in outputs and their total value for a
change in the two variables that are significant in the previous regression.  The results
suggest that total factor productivity improves by 13 % when land with titles increases by
one percent.  The simulated change in terms of revenue is US$ 500 million or 6 % of the
total agricultural gross product in the Legal Amazon in 1995.  They also suggest that total
factor productivity decreases by 5.8 percent and that revenue decreases by 240 million
when population increases by one percent.  Since Farrell’s input technical efficiency is
inverse output efficiency under constant returns to scale, the results also suggest that a 1311
% of reduction of input use is possible maintaining current level of outputs if land with
titles increases by one percent.  For example, 49,000 km2 of land clearing, which is one
percent of total forested area could be avoided for producing the same amount of outputs.








-0.506** -0.361** Density of Titled Land
(0.230) (0.183)
-0.335 -0.341 Distance to State Seat
(0.242) (0.235)
0.003*** 0.006*** Population Density
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.239 -0.245 Density of Good Soil
(0.352) (0.346)
Log Likelihood -338 -335
Inside parenthesis is standard deviation. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1 % level, respectively.
Table 3.3: Simulated Effects of the Exogenous Variables for the Legal
Amazon
1 % Change of Density of
 with Titles
1 % Change in Population
Density
% Increase in output 12.6 -5.8
Increase in value output (1985US$) 506 million -236 million
4. Conclusions
We found that provision of land title rights can induce a significant increase in
total factor productivity.  Such policies have to be adjusted regionally according the
current degree of property rights and technical efficiency.  Study shows that development
effect of land titling is important in policy making where inefficiency in resource use is
present but environmental regulation is costly as in the Brazilian Amazon.  Doing so12
might lead to a win-win situation where agriculture and timber producers increase
production while reducing current level of environmental damage.13
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